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Abstract 
Three experiments are reported which investigate the extent to which an authority figure 
influences the level of persuasion undergraduate students and research-active mathematicians 
invest in mathematical arguments. We demonstrate that, in some situations, both students and 
researchers rate arguments as being more persuasive when they are associated with an expert 
mathematician than when the author is anonymous. We develop a model which accounts for 
these data by suggesting that, for both students and researchers, an authority figure only plays a 
role when there is already some uncertainty about the argument’s mathematical status. 
Implications for pedagogy, and for future research, are discussed. 
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The Effect of Authority on the Persuasiveness of Mathematical Arguments 
It is widely argued that mathematical argumentation and proof should be central to the 
practice of learning mathematics at both the school and university levels (e.g. Hanna, 2007; 
National Council of Teachers of Mathematics [NCTM], 2000; Quality Assurance Agency, 2002; 
Schoenfeld, 1994). Consequently, students’ conceptions of argumentation and proof have been 
extensively studied by education researchers. Harel and Sowder (1998), for example, introduced 
the influential proof schemes framework, a classification of how students gain conviction in 
mathematical statements. Noting that many different proof schemes have been observed in use 
by students, Harel emphasized that students should be encouraged to evaluate mathematical 
arguments by using similar criteria to those deployed by professional research-active 
mathematicians: “The goal of instruction must be unambiguous; namely, to gradually refine 
current students’ proof schemes toward the proof scheme shared and practiced by the 
mathematicians of today.” (Harel, 2001, p.188). 
Other researchers have shared this view, emphasizing that expert mathematical practice is 
relevant for the design of pedagogy at both the school and university levels (Brousseau, 1997; 
Stylianou, 2002). As a consequence of similar views to this, Harel, Selden and Selden (2006) 
called for further research on expert and novice mathematical behavior, arguing that such 
research would lead to pedagogical insights. 
The goal of this paper is to explore the behavior of expert mathematicians and advanced 
mathematics students with respect to one specific factor that may influence the level of 
persuasion that they invest in a mathematical argument: the authority of the argument’s author. 
We first situate this work within the broader educational literature on mathematical 
argumentation and proof. 
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Background 
Argumentative Activities in Mathematics and Mathematics Education 
There is a wide variety of activities that students and mathematicians engage in, which 
could be described as related to mathematical argumentation and proof. In laying a preliminary 
map of all mathematical activities, Giaquinto (2005) provided a useful structure within which 
discussions of mathematical argumentation can be situated. He suggested that, for each 
mathematical activity, there are three associated general activities: producing, presenting, and 
taking in. In terms of argumentative activities these correspond to constructing a novel argument, 
presenting an available argument, and reading a given argument (with the aim of either 
evaluating or understanding it). In turn, each of these general activities can be performed with 
different goals in mind, which may engender different types of behavior and therefore lead to a 
finer categorization of mathematical activities regarding argumentation and proof. 
De Villiers (1990), following Bell’s (1976) initial categorization, produced a fivefold 
categorization of the functions of mathematical proof: verification (concerned with the truth of a 
statement), explanation (providing insight into why the statement is true), systematization (the 
organization of various results into a coherent deductive system), discovery (the 
discovery/invention of new results) and communication (the transmission of mathematical 
knowledge). Although de Villiers’s primary focus was on the functions of proof in mathematics, 
he argued that the categorization also applied to other types of mathematical argumentation, 
including both intuitive and empirical argumentation (see also de Villiers, 2004).
1
 
De Villiers’s categorization suggests that each of the three general activities related to 
mathematical argumentation presented by Giaquinto (2005) can be performed with different 
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goals in mind. For instance, the construction of an argument can be motivated by the estimation 
of the truth of a conjecture, the explanation of a given statement, its systematization, or simply to 
reach new results. Similarly, someone may present an argument in order to persuade a given 
audience of the conclusion’s truth, to provide them with insight into why it is true, or to 
demonstrate the argument’s validity in a given system. Finally, one may read an argument with 
the intention of understanding it, or in order to evaluate how persuasive, explanatory, or valid it 
is. Research has demonstrated that student behavior can greatly vary depending upon which of 
de Villiers’s goals they have in mind. Healy and Hoyles (2000), for example, found that students 
preferred empirical arguments when they focused on convincing themselves of the truth of a 
statement (an activity related to de Villiers’s verification), but preferred algebraic arguments 
when asked which argument they would give to their teacher (a function more closely related to 
de Villiers’s communication). The two activities related to mathematical argumentation that have 
been most widely studied by education researchers are the construction of arguments to gain 
conviction regarding the truth of a statement, and the reading of arguments with the intention of 
evaluating how persuasive they are. We now briefly review earlier work on these two important 
areas. 
Much research has focused upon how students construct arguments in order to convince 
themselves of the truth or falsity of mathematical statements. To be clear, in this paper we use 
the term gaining conviction to refer to the act of forming a belief about the (probable) truth or 
falsity of a mathematical statement.
2
 Clearly, one important way of gaining conviction in a 
statement is to construct an argument with the statement as its conclusion; and Harel and Sowder 
(1998) produced a categorization of the types of arguments that university students produce for 
this purpose. They found that empirical arguments were regularly used by students to convince 
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themselves, an observation which has also been made of students at other educational levels (e.g. 
Balacheff, 1987; Bell, 1976; Coe & Ruthven, 1994; Recio & Godino, 2001). Of particular 
relevance for the current study, Harel and Sowder also found that students would construct, or 
attempt to construct, arguments based on authority (typically by citing teacher or textbook 
remarks) in order to convince themselves. This issue is discussed further in the next section. 
Another widely studied mathematical activity, and one of relevance for the current study, 
consists of students evaluating how persuaded they are by a given mathematical argument. The 
activity of judging how persuasive one finds an argument is an important part of mathematics, 
and is an explicit goal of many school curricula. The NCTM’s (2000) Principles and Standards 
for School Mathematics, for example, stated that “students should develop high standards for 
accepting explanations” and should “formulate and critique explanations so [that] their 
classrooms become communities of inquiry” (p. 346). In this paper we use the term being 
persuaded to refer to the act of using a given mathematical argument to gain conviction in the 
(probable) truth or falsity of the statement that is the argument’s conclusion. Thus being 
persuaded by an argument is different from being convinced of a statement, as it is primarily 
focused on the properties of the given argument, whereas the activity of gaining conviction is 
primarily related to the statement and may be influenced by many (possibly unspecified) 
arguments, or none at all. 
The activity of argument evaluation has been studied in the literature in two main ways: 
(i) by investigating the processes students use when reading mathematical arguments, and (ii) by 
investigating the types of arguments that they find persuasive. 
Rav (1999) noted that the process of reading a mathematical argument is a complex one, 
and suggested that it typically involves extra deductive reasoning to fill any gaps left in the 
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argument. Such gaps are inevitable given the rarity and impractical length of strict formal 
derivations in mathematical texts (Fallis, 2003). Selden and Selden (2003) found that few 
undergraduate students engaged with such deductive gap-filling, but instead tended to 
concentrate on surface features when reading arguments.  
Weber (2008) analyzed the ways in which research-active mathematicians read purported 
proofs, concentrating on the methods by which they determine whether an argument constitutes a 
valid proof. He found that the mathematicians in his sample did regularly gap-fill when reading 
incomplete arguments, but that they did not use exclusively deductive methods to do so. Instead 
there were many instances of informal argument construction and, perhaps more surprisingly, the 
evaluation of one or more examples during the mathematicians’ decision making processes. 
Several of the mathematicians, when reflecting on their proof reading strategies, said that they 
might use different methods when reading student-generated arguments to arguments written by 
authority figures; i.e. that it was possible that they might spend longer checking that they were 
correct before rejecting a step in an expert’s proof, compared to a student-generated proof.  
As well as looking at the reading of arguments, researchers have also focused on the 
characteristics of arguments that students find persuasive. In a longitudinal study, Segal (1999) 
found that first year undergraduate students consistently rated empirical arguments, including 
one which consisted of the evaluation of a single example, as being highly persuasive. Knuth 
(2002) asked secondary school teachers to compare the persuasiveness of different arguments 
and found that teachers gave the highest ratings to arguments which used specific examples or 
visual representations, and to those whose terms and methods they were familiar with. Similar 
findings have been reported at the undergraduate level (Reid & Roberts, 2004). 
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Yackel and Cobb (1996) investigated the bases of students’ beliefs about what constitutes 
an appropriate argument, referring to such normative aspects of classroom interaction specific to 
mathematics as sociomathematical norms. Taking a sociocultural perspective, they argued that 
such understandings are formed by participation in mathematics classroom cultures, and are the 
result of the interaction and implicit negotiation between students and teachers. Similar kinds of 
norms have also been found to play a significant role in the context of an undergraduate 
education. Yackel, Rasmussen, and King (2000), for example, found that within the classroom 
culture of a differential equations course “because that’s the rule” constituted a legitimate 
mathematical explanation; in contrast entirely procedural explanations were considered 
illegitimate, and were challenged. 
Although many studies have focused on the factors (and their causes) which affect how 
persuasive school and university mathematics students find arguments, we are aware of no 
previous research related to how research-active mathematicians make such judgments. This is 
particularly surprising if—as Brousseau (1997), Harel (2001) and others have argued—
pedagogical practice related to proof should take as its goal the development of students’ 
behavior so that it better matches the practice of mathematicians. 
In the current paper we add to the growing literature on the factors which influence the 
persuasiveness of arguments by exploring one factor in detail: the presence or absence of an 
expert author. First we briefly review earlier work which has discussed this and related issues, 
with reference to both conviction and persuasion. 
The Role of Authority in Everyday and Mathematical Argumentation 
Appeals to expert opinion are widespread in everyday situations. Indeed, Walton (1997) 
went as far as to say that “nearly everything we believe is believable because it is based on the 
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opinion of experts” (p.1). Consequently, it is no surprise that arguments which are from highly 
credible sources are seen as being more persuasive than those which are not (e.g. Reinard, 1988; 
Sternthal, Phillips, & Dholakia, 1978). Walton (2006), in a survey of various types of defeasible 
argumentation, explicated the appeal to expert opinion (or argumentum ad verecundian) by 
laying out its argumentation scheme: 
Major Premise: Source E is an expert in subject domain D containing proposition P. 
Minor Premise: E asserts that P (in domain D) is true (false). 
Conclusion: P may plausibly be taken to be true (false). 
In the context of mathematics, two subtly different types of propositions are relevant for the 
current discussion. The first is where P is a straightforward mathematical statement, an example 
of which might be a theorem or lemma. In our terms as outlined above, this type of appeal to 
expert opinion relates to conviction, as P is a statement. A different type of appeal to expert 
opinion, which focuses upon the persuasiveness of an argument, can be made. This type has the 
following argumentation scheme:  
Major Premise: Source E is an expert in subject domain D containing argument A. 
Minor Premise: E asserts that argument A (in domain D) justifies (to a given extent) 
proposition P. 
Conclusion: A may plausibly be taken to justify (to a given extent) P. 
The distinction between conviction and persuasion leads to two different types of appeals to 
expert authority; and both types have been the subject of discussions in the literature.  
In an in-depth analysis of the role of proof in mathematics and mathematics education, 
Hanna (1983) asked what factors influence whether a theorem becomes accepted in the 
mathematical community. Apparently accepting that appeals to expert authority of the first type 
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do play an important role in mathematical practice, Hanna (1983) asserted that whether or not 
“the author has an unimpeachable reputation as an expert” is a factor which ranks above rigorous 
proof in determining whether a theorem will gain acceptance among mathematicians (p. 70). 
Reid (2002) enthusiastically endorsed Hanna’s analysis and went further, speculating that if 
professional mathematicians accept appeals to expert authority, then it could be reasonable to 
describe structurally similar arguments authored by students as being ‘mathematical’ and 
therefore legitimate. 
However, many researchers have apparently disagreed with Hanna’s (1983) and Reid’s 
(2002) claims about expert mathematical practice. In their comprehensive review of the types of 
evidence that students use to convince themselves of the truth of mathematical statements, Harel 
and Sowder (1998) found many instances of the “authoritarian proof scheme,” which essentially 
refers to appeals to expert opinion. Based on the view that the goal of instruction is to develop 
students’ proof schemes so that they match those shared by modern mathematicians, Harel and 
Sowder (2005) described the authoritarian proof scheme as “an undesirable, yet common, way of 
thinking” and suggested that instruction must “institute a didactical contract that attempts to 
suppress [it]”  (Harel & Sowder, 2007).  Cobb and Yackel (1996) made a similar suggestion, by 
citing the development of the sociomathematical norm of “intellectual autonomy”—where 
reliance on an external authority is not considered acceptable—as a “central pragmatic goal” of 
their work with mathematics classroom cultures (p. 179). A similar point was made by 
Stylianides (2007) in his discussion of how the teaching of proof in early educational settings 
could become “intellectually honest” to the discipline of mathematics. He gave the example of 
an appeal to expert opinion (of the first type) given by a student and approvingly noted that the 
classroom teacher disqualified the argument and instead “pushed the students to come up with a 
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mathematical argument” (p. 309, emphasis in the original). In summary, both Harel and Sowder 
and Stylianides expressed a belief that (i) students’ arguments should be primarily valued in 
terms of whether they match the kinds of arguments that form part of expert mathematical 
practice; (ii) students should be discouraged from making appeals to expert authority; and (iii) 
instruction should attempt to suppress such appeals. This line of argument appears to be based on 
the belief that, contrary to Hanna’s (1983) and Reid’s (2002) views, mathematicians do not make 
appeals to expert authority in their mathematical work. 
Hanna (2007) also discussed appeals to expert opinion with reference to the 
persuasiveness of purported proofs: 
It is in the very nature of proof that the validity of the conclusion flows from the proof 
itself, not from any external authority. Proof conveys to students the message that they 
can reason for themselves, that they do not need to defer to authority. (p. 31). 
Note that Hanna (2007) was not contradicting her earlier work. In this later discussion, she 
referred to appeals to expert opinion of the second type: where the proposition involved is not a 
mathematical statement (the case discussed by Hanna, 1983), but a claim about the 
persuasiveness of a purported proof. Other researchers have agreed on this point: Selden and 
Selden (2003), for example, wrote that “like midcentury structural critics, mathematicians seem 
to treat a proof as being independent from its author” (p. 6). Again, according to these 
researchers, mathematicians do not use appeals to expert opinion when evaluating the 
persuasiveness of purported proofs. However, as discussed above, Weber (2008) noted that some 
mathematicians claimed that they might use different methods to evaluate a student-generated 
proof compared to a proof written by a mathematician. In her discussion of Perelman’s purported 
proof of the Poincaré Conjecture, Jackson (2006) reported one mathematician’s views that 
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Perelman’s proof “must be right” because (i) if it were not, the collective expertise of the 
mathematical community would have found the mistake; and (ii) Perelman’s earlier work had 
been reliable (p. 899). Both of these statements seem to constitute appeals to expert opinion 
about the persuasiveness of Perelman’s proof.  
To summarize these earlier discussions, some researchers have argued that appeals to 
expert opinion are used by mathematicians to gain conviction in statements (Hanna, 1983; Reid, 
2002), but not to assess the persuasiveness of arguments (Hanna, 2007). Others have argued that 
mathematicians may be influenced by such appeals when engaged in this latter activity (Weber, 
2008); and some have implied that experts do not take into account authority figures when 
gaining conviction in statements (Harel & Sowder, 2005; Stylianides, 2007). Although it is clear 
that appeals to expert opinion do play an important role in everyday argumentation, it appears 
that there is little consensus in the literature as to the status of such appeals in expert 
mathematical practice. 
All the discussions about expert mathematical practice reviewed in this section were 
based upon philosophical/historical analyses, introspective reflections reported by 
mathematicians, introspections of the authors’ own practices, or impressions of the general 
mathematical culture. Crucially, none appears to be based on empirical studies of actual 
mathematical behavior. Our goal in this study was to add to these discussions by providing 
relevant empirical evidence; specifically, by asking: (i) Does the presence of an expert author 
increase the persuasiveness of mathematical arguments? (ii) Does this factor depend upon the 
type of argument? and (iii) Are research-active mathematicians and undergraduate students 
similarly affected by the presence of an expert author? 
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Experiment 1 
The goal of Experiment 1 was to directly compare the persuasiveness of various different 
types of mathematical arguments in two conditions: when the readers knew that the argument 
was written by an authority figure, and when they did not. If knowledge of an expert author has 
no effect upon participants’ judgments about the persuasiveness of arguments, one would expect 
no significant differences between the mean reported persuasion ratings of the two conditions. 
Method 
We used the internet to present our tasks and gather our data in order to maximize our 
sample size. As noted by Reips (2000), this method does present some practical difficulties, in 
particular the problem of multiple submissions from the same individual. We adopted the 
strategy advised by Reips, and implemented by Johnson-Laird and Savary (1999), and logged the 
IP address of each participant and the time they submitted their responses. Under the assumption 
that each IP address was associated with a unique individual, these data were used to screen for 
possible cases of multiple submission. 
Web-based experimental methods have been found to produce results that are consistent 
with those found by traditional methods (Gosling, Vazire, Srivastava, & John, 2004; Krantz & 
Dalal, 2000), rendering it difficult to suggest that internet data are less valid than traditional data. 
Given these findings, our adherence to Reips’s (2000) guidelines, and the impracticality of 
obtaining large samples of research-active mathematicians in any other fashion, we believe the 
use of a web-based approach is justified in this instance. 
Participants. Participants were 384 unpaid volunteers. A total of 190 research-active 
mathematicians employed at Australian and British universities took part, together with 194 
second and third year undergraduates from three highly ranked British universities. All three 
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universities only recruited students who had been very high achievers during their school 
studies,
3
 and had syllabi that emphasized formal rigorous proof from the outset of the course. 
Each participant was recruited by means of an email message, sent from their 
departmental secretary, which explained the task and asked them to visit the experimental 
website should they wish to participate. The researchers and students participated through 
identical websites hosted at different addresses (in order to ensure that the two groups’ responses 
were kept apart), and before each researcher commenced the task they were asked to declare that 
they were a “research-active mathematician.” 
Materials. Three different arguments were used: a heuristic argument about the digits of 
?, an induction argument about the size of the n-th prime, and a visual argument about the fixed 
point theorem. The three arguments were selected to be challenging enough so as not to be trivial 
for research-active mathematicians, but also not so complicated that undergraduates could not 
understand them. Furthermore, each of the arguments needed to have been written by an 
authoritative source. The heuristic and visual arguments were based on published work by two 
highly respected mathematicians: Professors W. T. Gowers and J. E. Littlewood respectively 
(Gowers, 2006, p. 194; Littlewood, 1953, p. 37).
4
 The induction argument was taken from an 
undergraduate textbook (Jones & Jones, 1998, p.26). The three arguments are given in full in the 
Appendix. 
Procedure. Once a participant had loaded the experimental website, they were presented 
with one of the three arguments and randomly assigned into one of two conditions: those who 
were told the identity of the author (the named condition), and those who were not (the 
anonymous condition). The named and anonymous conditions were identical, except for the 
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presence or absence of the identity of the author (see the Appendix for details of how this 
information was phrased). 
Participants were given the instruction: 
“After having read this argument please say to what extent you are persuaded by it. If you 
would like to comment, or explain your selection, please do so.” 
A sliding bar was used to record each participant’s reported level of persuasion in the argument, 
from 0% (not persuaded) to 100% (totally persuaded); and a text box was used to collect 
comments from those participants who wished to leave them. Upon completion of the task, 
participants submitted their response and the next argument was loaded. For each new argument 
participants were randomly reallocated into either the named or the anonymous conditions. The 
order in which the arguments appeared followed a counterbalanced Latin square design. As the 
experimental design included the anonymous control condition, and since participants were 
assigned to conditions randomly, any possible between-conditions differences in participants’ 
mean reported level of persuasion could only be attributed to the difference in the conditions: the 
presence or absence of an authority figure. 
Results 
The mean response from each group for each argument are shown in Table 1 and graphed 
in Figure 1.
5
 There were large individual differences in how participants from both groups 
responded to each argument. When responding to Gowers’s heuristic argument in the 
anonymous condition, for example, one researcher responded with 0% and wrote “do you really 
think a ‘research mathematician’ will be persuaded by this?” Another, responding to the same 
argument, and in the same condition, gave a rating of 100% and wrote “this argument completely 
persuades me that the conjecture is reasonable.” Perhaps these large individual differences can be 
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attributed to different interpretations of the instructions. Nevertheless, searching for between-
condition differences in mean responses allows us to interrogate the influence that the presence 
of an authority figure had on participants’ reported level of persuasion in the arguments. 
___________________________ 
Insert Table 1 about here 
___________________________ 
___________________________ 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
___________________________ 
A univariate analysis of variance (ANOVA) with three factors (group, argument and 
condition) was conducted. A significant three-way interaction was found, F(2,1094)=4.35, 
MSE=980.7, p=0.013, suggesting that separate analyses should be conducted for each argument. 
Students reported higher levels of persuasion in the heuristic argument than the 
researchers, F(1,370)=5.81, MSE=928.5, p=0.016. Crucially, there was also a significant main 
effect for condition, F(1,370)=5.45, MSE=928.5, p=0.020, showing that those participants who 
knew the argument was written by Gowers rated the argument as more persuasive than those 
who did not (a mean difference of 8%). When the analysis was restricted to only the researchers, 
this effect retained significance, t(178)=2.19, p=0.030. There was no significant group?condition 
interaction effect, F<1. 
Surprisingly, for the visual argument the group?condition interaction effect was 
significant, F(1,372)=12.2, MSE=1095.0, p=0.001. Considering each group separately revealed 
that the researchers reported a higher level of persuasion if they knew it was written by 
Littlewood, with a mean difference of 17%, t(188)=3.46, p=0.001; but this was not the case for 
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the students, who showed a small and non-significant trend in the opposite direction t(184)=1.41, 
NS. 
The researchers found the induction argument to be more persuasive than the students, 
F(1,352)=4.40, MSE=914.8, p=0.037. However, there was no main effect for condition, nor a 
group?condition interaction, Fs<1. 
Discussion 
The results from Experiment 1 suggest that, in some cases at least, both undergraduate 
students and research-active mathematicians are influenced by the presence of an authority figure 
when evaluating mathematical arguments. Participants reported a higher level of persuasion for 
the heuristic argument when they knew it was written by Gowers, but there was no difference for 
the textbook’s induction argument. The data from the visual argument, however, were more 
complex. The researchers who knew the argument had been written by Littlewood ranked it as 
being more persuasive than those who did not know; this was not the case for the students. These 
data are discussed in detail in the next section, beginning with the results for the visual argument.  
Accounting for the visual group?condition interaction. One initial hypothesis to account 
for the significant group?condition interaction effect on the visual argument might be that the 
students were not as familiar with Littlewood’s status as an expert mathematician as the 
researchers. However, if this were the sole reason, one would have expected similar 
group?condition interactions in the heuristic and visual arguments, as Littlewood is at least as 
well known as Gowers. (In fact the group?condition?argument interaction effect was significant 
for the visual and heuristic arguments, F(1,742)=3.96, MSE=4002.5, p=0.047, indicating that the 
group?condition interactions for these two arguments were different). 
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To gain deeper insight into the reasons behind the visual argument group?condition 
interaction, we conducted an analysis on the explanatory comments left by participants. 
Approximately 20% of participants left comments. For each argument, in each condition, 
the difference between the mean level of persuasion reported by comment-leavers and non-
comment-leavers did not approach significance, all ps>0.15, suggesting that those participants 
who left comments were not unrepresentative of the entire sample. The two authors of this paper 
independently assigned each comment to one of five pre-defined categories; these codings were 
then compared and the few disagreements discussed and resolved. One category (about the 
explanatory value of the argument) was only used by two participants, and so was incorporated 
into the “other” category. 
___________________________ 
Insert Table 2 about here 
___________________________ 
The range of explanatory comments given by each group is shown in Table 2. The two 
groups had a different range, ?2(3)=20.9, p<0.001, with the researchers more often discussing 
how easy or difficult it would be to turn the argument into a proof, and the students more often 
stating that a picture is not a proof. Indeed, many student comments in this category emphasized 
that they had been taught that a picture is not a proof. One student, for example, wrote that 
“trying to prove with a graph is a cardinal sin, as I have been taught.” In contrast, few of the 
researchers took such a position, and instead tended to concentrate on factors such as how easy it 
would be to turn the argument into a formal proof.  
These data suggest that many students were reluctant to give any credence to visual 
arguments. Littlewood (1953) himself discussed this issue, remarking that “my pupils will not 
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use pictures, even unofficially.” This phenomenon has also been documented by several 
mathematics education researchers (e.g. Dreyfus, 1994; Vinner, 1989). Littlewood put the blame 
on what he saw as inappropriate pedagogical strategies: 
A heavy warning used to be given [by lecturers] that pictures are not rigorous; this has 
never had its bluff called and has permanently frightened its victims into playing for 
safety. Some pictures, of course, are not rigorous, but I should say most are (and I use 
them whenever possible myself). (p.35). 
It seems reasonable to hypothesize that this reluctance on the part of students to trust visual 
arguments could be the result of a sociomathematical norm (in the sense of Yackel & Cobb, 
1996) initiated by the kinds of pedagogical interventions described by Littlewood, and then 
reinforced through students’ and lecturers’ activities in lecture theatres and seminar rooms.  
This factor could account for the group?condition interaction detected for the visual 
argument. Many students were not influenced by the presence or absence of the authority figure 
as they believed, as a consequence of the sorts of pedagogical strategies mentioned by 
Littlewood, that visual arguments are not acceptable. In comparison, the researchers seemed to 
operate in accordance with a more flexible norm regarding the validity of visual arguments, and 
so were more open to being persuaded by them.
6
 
Accounting for the induction argument non-effect. Participants in both groups and in both 
conditions ranked the induction argument as being highly persuasive (with mean ratings of 
around 80%), and there was no significant differences between the mean level of persuasion 
recorded in each condition. We see three possible ways of accounting for this. One hypothesis is 
that mathematicians (and talented undergraduates) completely ignored the source of a purported 
formal proof when judging how persuasive it was. Another possibility is that the induction 
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argument was too simple to reveal any effect. In more complicated cases where there is 
substantial doubt about a purported proof (such as the Perelman proof discussed by Jackson, 
2006) perhaps there would be an effect. One final possibility would be that the authority figure 
for this proof—an undergraduate textbook—was not as authoritative as either Gowers or 
Littlewood. 
In order to investigate this issue further we replicated Experiment 1 using a more 
complex formal proof, with a better known authority figure, in place of the induction argument. 
Experiment 2 
The main goals of Experiment 2 were (i) to replicate the main results in Experiment 1, 
(ii) to investigate the effect that an authority figure has on the level of persuasion that 
mathematicians invest in more complex formal proofs than the induction argument used in 
Experiment 1, and (iii) to investigate whether or not a more authoritative figure than an 
undergraduate textbook can make a formal proof more persuasive. In view of the need to use a 
considerably more complex proof than the induction argument, it was decided to collect data 
from research-active mathematicians, but not undergraduate students.  
Method 
Participants were 71 research-active mathematicians employed at universities in the 
United States.
7
 An identical procedure and set of materials were used to that in Experiment 1, 
with the exception that the induction argument was replaced by a more complicated argument 
about the area of a polynomial’s tangential triangle. This latter argument was written by George 
Pólya (and had been adapted from the version published by Aigner and Ziegler, 2000, p. 103). It 
is given in full in the Appendix. 
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Results 
Participants’ mean reported levels of persuasion in the three arguments are shown in 
Table 3. In the heuristic and visual arguments the pattern of responses essentially replicated 
those found in Experiment 1. Participants in the named condition had a higher mean reported 
level of persuasion in the visual argument than those in the anonymous condition, t(65)=2.93, 
p=0.003, one-tailed.
8
 A similar result was found in the heuristic argument, t(69)=1.78, p=0.040, 
one-tailed. For both arguments, the magnitudes of the difference in means were approximately 
equal to the equivalent differences for the researcher group in Experiment 1. 
___________________________ 
Insert Table 3 about here 
___________________________ 
However, in the Pólya argument, there was no difference between the mean reported 
level of persuasion, t(58)=0.003, NS, with participants in both conditions rating the argument as 
highly persuasive. 
Discussion 
The results from the heuristic and visual arguments replicated the results from the 
researcher group in Experiment 1, giving confidence that these findings are real effects. 
However, despite the increased complexity of the Pólya argument compared to the induction 
argument, there was no difference in the mean reported level of persuasion for each condition. 
This result would appear to rule out the third hypothesis put forward to explain the lack of effect 
in the induction argument in Experiment 1—that the undergraduate textbook was not 
authoritative enough. George Pólya is a well known and highly respected mathematician, and 
(one would think) a mathematician who would be held in similar levels of esteem as both 
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Gowers and Littlewood (who were apparently sufficiently authoritative to produce effects on the 
heuristic and visual arguments). 
However, the data from Experiment 2 are unable to distinguish between the first and 
second hypotheses. It may be that an effect would be found for extremely complex formal 
proofs, such as the Perelman case discussed in the introduction. Of course, Perelman’s purported 
proof of the Poincaré conjecture is of several orders of magnitude more complex than the Pólya 
argument used in Experiment 2; it may be that a formal proof too complex to be practical for an 
empirical study would be needed to detect any effect. Alternatively, it may be that 
mathematicians completely ignore the source of an argument that looks like a formal proof. 
Although the data from Experiments 1 and 2 give us confidence that the effects detected 
for the visual and heuristic arguments are real—the presence of an authority figure caused 
participants to report higher level of persuasion in an argument than they would otherwise do—it 
could be that the difference was an unintended consequence of the instructions that we used. 
Rather than actually affect a person’s level of persuasion in the argument, the presence of an 
authority figure might merely have altered their interpretation of the question. 
Although participants had been asked to rate the extent to which they were persuaded by 
the argument, evidence from the explanatory comments left by participants suggested that some 
participants had interpreted these instructions in different ways. For example, one participant 
responded to the heuristic argument with a rating of 2% and commented that “if a manuscript 
that made an analogous argument came to me for refereeing, I’d recommend it be rejected for 
lack of mathematical rigor.” Another gave an 80% rating and wrote, “After reading the 
argument, if the claim were proved to be false I’d be surprised and intrigued.” The first 
participant seemed to have interpreted the instructions as a question about the admissibility of the 
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argument in the context of an academic mathematics journal—whether the argument met the 
expected standards for presentation in such a context. In contrast the second participant seems to 
have interpreted more in the manner we intended—by evaluating the extent to which they were 
persuaded by the argument, i.e., the extent to which they believed the argument allowed them to 
gain conviction in the truth of the argument’s conclusion. 
One way of accounting for the results of Experiments 1 and 2 is to suggest that the 
presence of an authority figure changed the way in which participants interpreted the request to 
rate their level of persuasion. For example, the presence of an authority figure might have biased 
participants away from conducting an evaluation that focused on the admissibility of the 
argument in a given context (as in the first example above), and towards conducting an 
evaluation about the persuasiveness of the argument (as in the second example above).
9
 To rule 
out this possibility we conducted Experiment 3. 
Experiment 3 
The main goal of Experiment 3 was to test whether the results of Experiment 1 and 2 
survived if the question was altered in such a way as to encourage participants to evaluate the 
extent to which they believed the argument allowed them to gain conviction in the truth of the 
argument’s conclusion. If the effects found in Experiments 1 and 2 were due to the presence of 
an authority figure altering participants’ interpretations of the instructions, one would expect 
these effects to be eliminated in Experiment 3. 
Method 
Participants were 214 research-active mathematicians from universities affiliated with the 
Association of Commonwealth Universities, and from universities in the United States. An 
identical set of materials and procedure was used to Experiment 1, except that all the statements 
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being discussed were referred to as ‘claims’ (rather than theorems or conjectures), and the 
instructions read: 
Now say to what extent you are persuaded that the claim is true, given the information, 
and only the information, that is contained in the argument. If you would like to 
comment, or explain your selection, please do so. 
The aim of these alternative instructions was to bias participants towards evaluating their level of 
persuasion, as we have used the term in this paper; i.e. to determine the extent to which the given 
argument allows them to gain conviction in the (probable) truth or falsity of the argument’s 
conclusion. 
Results and Discussion 
The mean responses to the three arguments are shown in Table 4. In the heuristic and 
visual arguments, the pattern of responses essentially replicated those found in Experiments 1 
and 2. Participants in the named condition found the heuristic argument to be more persuasive 
than those in the anonymous condition, t(212.0)=2.75, p=0.007, with the magnitude of the 
difference in means similar to that found in the previous experiments. A similar result was found 
in the visual argument, t(208)=2.37, p=0.019, although the magnitude of the difference of the 
means was somewhat less than those found in Experiments 1 and 2. As before, no significant 
between-conditions difference in ratings was found for the induction argument, t(200.8)=1.83, 
NS. 
___________________________ 
Insert Table 3 about here 
___________________________ 
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The results of Experiment 3 reduce the likelihood that the effects detected in Experiments 
1 and 2 were the result of the presence of an authority figure biasing participants into a different 
interpretation of the question. If that account were correct we would have expected the between-
conditions differences to have been eliminated in Experiment 3, the instructions of which pushed 
participants into conducting consistent evaluations. In Experiment 3 the instructions emphasized 
the importance of evaluating the persuasiveness of the argument only given the information 
contained in the argument, and the main effects found for the research-active mathematicians in 
Experiments 1 and 2 were replicated. 
General Discussion 
Summary of Main Findings 
In this paper three experiments have been reported which demonstrate that, in some 
situations, mathematics students and researchers report higher level of persuasion in 
mathematical arguments that are associated with an authority figure than in those not so 
associated.  
Experiment 1 demonstrated that, for research-active mathematicians, authority figures 
increased the persuasiveness of two non-formal arguments, one heuristic and one visual. 
Surprisingly, although undergraduate students also reported higher levels of persuasion when 
they knew the identity of the heuristic argument’s author, they did not exhibit the same behavior 
on the visual argument. Neither group was more persuaded by a formal induction proof if they 
knew it came from a textbook. In Experiment 2 it was shown that the reason for a lack of an 
effect on the induction argument was not that the proof was too simple or that the textbook 
lacked authority: a similar result was found using a more complex proof written by George 
Pólya, a highly authoritative mathematician. Finally, Experiment 3 suggested that the results of 
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Experiments 1 and 2 were unlikely to be artifactual consequences of the task’s instructions. The 
task was varied slightly to encourage participants to interpret the instructions in a consistent 
manner, and similar effects were found to those in the previous experiments. 
A Model 
Experiments 1, 2, and 3 suggest that, in some cases, students and mathematicians are 
influenced by an authority figure when evaluating mathematical arguments. However, this was 
not the case for every argument. One model which accounts for these different cases is illustrated 
in Figure 2. The model suggests that the source of an argument only influences the reader’s 
reported level of persuasion if, having read the argument, the reader is left uncertain about it. 
That is to say, an authority figure can only operate on the uncertainty associated with an 
argument. 
___________________________ 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
___________________________ 
The data regarding each of the arguments used in this paper can now be accounted for in 
turn. For Gowers’s heuristic argument, neither the students nor the researchers seemed clear as to 
whether the argument was suitable to support its (non-absolute) conclusion. In terms of the 
model, there was uncertainty associated with the argument; and this uncertainty was operated on 
by the authority figure, leaving those participants in the named condition with a higher mean 
reported level of persuasion than those in the anonymous condition. For the induction argument 
the reverse was true: neither students nor researchers were left with much doubt as to the 
sufficiency of the argument. Consequently there was no uncertainty for the presence of the 
authority figure to operate on, and no effect for condition was detected. A similar explanation 
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accounts for the lack of an effect for researchers on the Pólya argument. Whether this would be 
the case for all formal proofs, or whether an extremely complex formal proof would result in 
sufficient doubt to cause an effect for authority, remains an open question. 
The data from the visual argument require a more complex explanation. We suggest that 
the students in Experiment 1 tended to be left with less uncertainty about the argument’s 
suitability than the researchers. As a consequence of a sociomathematical norm related to the 
status of visual arguments, many students seemed clear that the argument was not mathematical. 
There was no uncertainty on which the authority figure could operate, and consequently no effect 
for condition was found. The researchers, in contrast, appeared to have a different norm 
associated with visual arguments. As shown above, only two comment-leaving researchers 
rejected the argument simply by virtue of its visual status, but 12 instead concentrated on how 
close the argument was to a formal proof. In terms of the model, this more flexible view of the 
status of visual arguments led the researchers to have more doubts about the suitability of the 
argument. Consequently, there was more uncertainty on which the authority figure could operate, 
and a (large) effect was found for condition, with those knowing that Littlewood had written the 
argument having a higher mean level of persuasion than those who did not. 
A remaining issue is to explain why an expert authority figure caused participants to 
increase their reported level of persuasion in arguments about which they were uncertain. One 
participants’ explanatory comment (with reference to the heuristic argument) indicates a 
possibility: “We are told the argument is made by a reputable mathematician, so we implicitly 
assume that he would tell us if he knew of any evidence or convincing arguments to the 
contrary.” (Researcher). 
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The researcher here suggested that Gowers’s reputation gave confidence that he was not 
being deliberately misleading by hiding any evidence against his conclusion. It is also plausible 
(although not explicitly stated by this researcher) that Gowers’s expertise as a mathematician 
suggested to participants that if any counter-evidence existed he would, in all likelihood, be 
aware of it. A similar suggestion accounts for the visual argument; researchers, being uncertain 
of its mathematical status, could reasonably conclude that Littlewood, being a renowned 
mathematician, would (i) have sufficient background knowledge to be aware of any conflicting 
evidence if it existed (any unusual counterexamples, for example), and (ii) be trustworthy 
enough to not withhold any such evidence.  
The model allows for several further factors which may affect a person’s level of 
persuasion in an argument. Although all the cases reported in this paper were of a reader’s 
uncertainty generated by concerns over the nature of a mathematical argument, we suggest that 
this may not be the only factor which creates uncertainty. An argument may simply be too hard 
to understand, or perhaps a reader may not want to invest sufficient effort into understanding it. 
Although we have not tested this hypothesis, the model predicts that the presence of an authority 
figure would have an effect in cases of this type. 
In summary, the model illustrated in Figure 2 suggests that, for both mathematics 
researchers and mathematics students, an authority figure does influence their level of persuasion 
in an argument, but only when there is already some uncertainty about the argument’s 
mathematical status. The model accounts for all the data reported in this paper, and also makes 
several specific predictions suitable for future testing. 
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Relations to Other Disciplines 
As discussed in the introduction, several researchers have designed instruction that 
attempts to develop students’ “intellectual autonomy” by devaluing appeals to expert opinion 
within the mathematics classroom (e.g. Cobb & Yackel, 1996; Harel & Sowder, 1998; 
Stylianides, 2007). This practice contrasts sharply to other disciplines; a key goal of history 
education is, for example, to develop students’ abilities to judge a source’s reliability (e.g. 
Pontecorvo & Girardet, 1993).  In this section we briefly contrast the findings reported in this 
study to related findings from an area where the influence of expert opinion has been extensively 
studied: the process of academic peer review. 
In some disciplines single-blind peer review processes—where the reviewers are aware 
of the authors’ identities and affiliations—are commonplace. The evidence on whether this 
practice creates bias is conflicting, and seems to be dependent upon the discipline involved. 
Evidence suggests that psychologists and economists are influenced by the names and affiliations 
of authors when reviewing papers (Blank, 1991; Peters & Ceci, 1982), but that medical 
researchers are not (van Rooyen, Godless, Evans, Smith & Black, 1998). 
There are several important differences between the process of reviewing a research 
article and the task reported in this paper. Reviewers, as well as evaluating the extent to which 
they are persuaded by the argument presented in a research paper, must also evaluate, among 
other things, the article’s significance and clarity. Nevertheless, the results of research on peer 
review are not inconsistent with the model we propose above. One might speculate that, in 
disciplines such as economics and psychology, articles more often report studies which 
incorporate compromises that are difficult to evaluate objectively, inevitably leading to some 
uncertainty in the evaluation process. In comparison, medical researchers typically have very 
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strict objective guidelines as to what constitutes a persuasive article (see, for example, Begg et 
al., 1996). This factor may lead to a greater proportion of reviewers in social science disciplines 
being uncertain of a manuscript’s persuasiveness than in natural science disciplines, which in 
turn may lead to (following the model) more reviewers being influenced by the author’s 
affiliation and name. 
Implications 
Earlier researchers have disagreed about the normative status of appeals to expert opinion 
in mathematical reasoning. Hanna (1983) and Reid (2002) both suggested that mathematicians 
use appeals to expert opinion to gain conviction in mathematical statements. In contrast, Harel 
and Sowder (1998, 2007) and Stylianides (2007) both suggested that using authority figures in 
this fashion is mathematically undesirable. It is important to emphasize that the data reported in 
this paper do not allow us to distinguish between these positions. Our study concentrated on 
whether an appeal to expert opinion affects the persuasiveness of an argument. Hanna (2007) 
and Selden and Selden (2003) suggested that the persuasiveness of purported proofs is evaluated 
independently of their authors. Our study did not produce evidence against this particular belief 
(indeed, we found that the presence of an authority did not affect mathematicians’ evaluation of 
two purported proofs), but showed that when evaluating the persuasiveness of other types of 
arguments in mathematics, both mathematicians and mathematics students can be influenced by 
their source. Moreover, our model predicts that, contrary to the position asserted by Selden and 
Selden (2003), factors like extreme difficulty and time restrictions may lead mathematicians to 
appeal to expert opinion when evaluating the persuasiveness of purported proofs. Such factors 
are likely to lead to high levels of uncertainty in the written argument, and thus would increase 
the influence of an associated authority figure. Future research on the effect of these and other 
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factors will improve our understanding of the ways in which students and mathematicians read 
and evaluate different types of arguments in mathematics. 
As a result of their views on the undesirability of appeals to expert opinion, several 
researchers have designed instruction with the explicit aim of discouraging students from taking 
into account authority figures (e.g. Cobb & Yackel, 1996; Stylianides, 2007). The data reported 
in this paper, however, suggest a subtly different approach. When research mathematicians are 
uncertain about the mathematical status of an argument, they too seem to be influenced by the 
argument’s source. But, crucially, the presence of a source appears to have no effect when 
participants have little uncertainty about the argument’s status. During their studies, weaker 
students are disproportionately likely to be uncertain about the arguments they meet, so it is not 
surprising that it is they who are regarded as being more likely to rely upon authority figures to 
judge arguments. However, we suggest that relying upon, or looking for, an authority figure 
should not be seen as undesirable behavior per se. Instead, the emphasis should be placed on 
empowering students by ensuring that they are in a position where they do not need to take into 
account an authority figure: where they have little uncertainty about the mathematical status of 
formal arguments. 
Notwithstanding this suggestion, the case of the visual argument indicates that a greater 
mathematical maturity is not always correlated with less uncertainty over all types of argument. 
We have argued that, as a group, the researchers in our study were more uncertain about the 
validity of Littlewood’s visual argument than the students. Because of (what Littlewood saw as) 
inappropriate pedagogical strategies, many undergraduate students are apparently unpersuaded 
by visual arguments—regardless of their source. If this interpretation is correct, the pedagogical 
practices of undergraduate mathematics lecturers may support, if not develop, sociomathematical 
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norms in the lecture hall that differ significantly from those shared by practicing mathematicians. 
In the particular case of the persuasiveness of visual arguments in mathematics, lecturers may be 
conveying only part of the story: students seem to be responding to the “heavy warning” that 
pictures may be misleading, while letting pass the potential of visual arguments for providing 
insight and suggesting results in mathematics. Exploring in more detail the range of 
sociomathematical norms researchers and undergraduates act in accordance with in relation to 
visual arguments, and whether or not the differences between these two sets of norms are 
desirable, would appear to be an interesting area for future research (c.f. Arcavi, 2003; Dreyfus, 
1994; Vinner, 1989). 
One final implication of the studies reported in this paper concerns the differences 
between expert and novice mathematical behavior. We agree with those researchers who have 
suggested that one of the major aims of an undergraduate education in mathematics should be to 
develop students’ skills so that they more closely match expert behavior (e.g. Brousseau, 1997; 
Harel et al., 2006; Stylianou, 2002). Recently, however, Weber (2008) demonstrated that expert 
mathematical behavior is complex and sometimes unexpected. He found that mathematicians 
would regularly use non-deductive methods—even including the evaluation of a single 
example—when bridging gaps in formal deductive proofs. Such behavior is surprising given the 
low status given to empirical reasoning in formal mathematical discourse, and resulting 
educational frameworks (e.g. Balacheff, 1987). The results of the current study support Weber’s 
view that expert mathematical behavior can be unexpectedly multifaceted. Indeed, many of the 
mathematicians who participated in the study and asked to be debriefed expressed surprise at the 
results. It is clear that expert mathematical behavior does not necessarily match the received 
view of expert mathematical behavior. 
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Mathematics educators have, when constructing an understanding of the nature of 
mathematics, typically relied upon philosophical accounts, introspective reports from 
mathematicians, and historical analyses of the development of mathematical concepts. While 
these methods are all undeniably useful for gaining a deeper understanding of the nature of 
mathematics, we believe that empirical research has an important contribution to make in the 
development, testing, and refinement of models of expert mathematical practice. 
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Appendix 
 
Italicized bold text was only visible to participants in the named condition. 
 
The Heuristic Argument 
Here is an open conjecture: 
Conjecture. Somewhere in the decimal expansion of ? there are one million sevens in a row. 
Here is a heuristic argument about the claim, taken from a talk by Prof. Timothy 
Gowers, University of Cambridge: 
All the evidence is that there is nothing very systematic about the sequence of digits of ?. 
Indeed, they seem to behave much as they would if you just chose a sequence of random digits 
between 0 to 9. This hunch sounds vague, but it can be made precise as follows: there are various 
tests that statisticians perform on sequences to see whether they are likely to have been generated 
randomly, and it looks very much as though the sequences of digits of ? would pass these tests. 
Certainly the first few million do. One obvious test is to see whether any short sequence of 
digits, such as 137, occurs with about the right frequency in the long term. In the case of the 
string 137 one would expect it to crop up about 1/1000th of the time in the decimal expansion of 
?. 
Experience strongly suggests that short sequences in the decimal expansion of the 
irrational numbers that crop up in nature, such as ?, e or ?2, do occur with the correct 
frequencies. And if that is so, then we would expect a million sevens in the decimal expansion of 
? about 10?1000000 of the time—and it is of course, no surprise, that we will not actually be able to 
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check that directly. And yet, the argument that it does eventually occur, while not a proof, is 
pretty convincing. 
 
The Induction Argument 
Theorem. The n-th prime pn satisfies  for all . 
Here is an argument about the claim, taken from G. A. Jones & J. M. Jones, 
‘Elementary Number Theory’, Springer 1998: 
To show that the theorem is true use strong induction on n. The result is true for n=1, 
since . Now assume that the result is true for each n = 1, 2, … k. We know that  
p1 p2… pk + 1 must be divisible by some prime p, and this prime cannot be one of p1 , p2, … pk 
for then it would divide 1, which is impossible. Now, this new prime p must be at least as large 
as the (k+1)-th prime pk+1, so 
pk+1 ? p
? p1p2...pk +1
? 22
0
? 22
1
? ...? 22
k?1
+1
= 21+2+4+...+2
k?1
+1
= 22
k ?1
+1
=
1
2
? 22
k
+1
? 22
k
 
Therefore the result is true for n = k+1. So the result is true for all n ? 1. 
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The Visual Argument 
Here is a statement of the Fixed Point Theorem: 
Theorem. Let f(x) be continuous and increasing on [0,1], such that . Let 
 and . Then under iteration of f every point is either a fixed 
point, or else converges to a fixed point. 
 
Here is an argument about the theorem, taken from ‘A Mathematician’s Miscellany’ by 
Prof. J. E. Littlewood: 
The only proof needed is [see Figure 3]: 
___________________________ 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
___________________________ 
 
The Pólya argument 
Theorem. Let  be a real polynomial of degree  with only real roots, such that 
 for  and . Let  and let T be the area of the 
tangential triangle given by  [see Figure 4]. Then 
2
3
?T ? A. 
Here is an argument about the claim, taken from a review by George Pólya 
(Mathematical Reviews, vol 1, p. 1): 
Since  only has real roots, and none of them in the open interval , it can be 
written – apart from a constant positive factor which cancels out in the end – in the form 
 with . Hence 
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. By making the substitution , we find that also 
. And hence by the inequality of the arithmetic and 
geometric mean (note that all factors are ): 
 
Let us compute  and . (We may assume that , since 
otherwise  and the inequality 
2
3
?T ? A becomes trivial). By above we see that 
, and similarly . Hence we 
conclude A >
2
3
? f '(1) f '(?1)( )
1
2 . Applying now the inequality of the harmonic and the geometric 
mean to  and , we arrive at the conclusion 
A >
2
3
? 2
1
? f '(1)
+
1
f '(?1)
=
4
3
f '(1) f '(?1)
f '(1) ? f '(?1)
? 
? ? 
? 
? ? 
=
2
3
?T . 
 
___________________________ 
Insert Figure 4 about here 
___________________________ 
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Notes 
1 
Some authors (e.g. Martin & Harel, 1989; Healy & Hoyles, 2000) have used the term ‘proof’ in 
its everyday sense, as an argument which persuades. Others (e.g. de Villiers, 1990) retain the 
term for deductive arguments. We have attempted to adopt the more neutral term ‘argument’ 
unless specifically referring to an argument which would universally be referred to by 
mathematicians as a proof (a more satisfactory characterization of what constitutes a proof is a 
difficult and current philosophical topic, and is well beyond the scope of this paper; see, for 
example, Azzouni, 2005; Bundy, 2005; Thurston, 1994). 
2
 We prefer the term “gaining conviction” to more linguistically satisfying alternatives such as 
“becoming convinced,” as we wish to emphasize the continuous nature of one’s level of 
conviction. In particular, conviction in our sense does not imply a threshold level at which one 
moves from being unconvinced to being convinced. 
3 
All three universities typically required that their prospective mathematics undergraduates 
obtain grades of AAA—the highest possible—in their A Level examinations (the qualification 
taken by school leavers in England and Wales).
 
4
 Both named mathematicians in Experiment 1 are very highly regarded in the mathematical 
community. Gowers received the 1998 Fields Medal (the mathematical equivalent of the Nobel 
Prize) for his work on functional analysis and combinatorics. Littlewood is well known for his 
prolific collaboration with Hardy in the fields of number theory and classical analysis; amongst 
other awards, he received the LMS De Morgan medal, the Royal Medal of the Royal Society of 
London and the LMS Senior Berwick Prize.
 
5
 Due to an initial typographical error in the presentation of the induction argument, the first 18 
responses from the researcher group were removed from the analysis of this argument.  
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6
 The issue of whether or not a picture can be a proof is a controversial topic in the philosophy of 
mathematics literature (e.g. Brown, 1997; Folina, 1999). 
7
 Throughout the study we approached research-intensive universities from English speaking 
countries to participate. In practice, this meant selecting universities from the Association of 
Commonwealth Universities membership list (for non-U.S. universities) and the USNews.com 
“Best Graduate Schools” list of “top mathematics programs” (for U.S. universities). 
8
 One-tailed tests were used for the heuristic and visual comparisons, as predictions of the 
direction of the difference in means existed from Experiment 1 (these comparisons constituted 
direct replications of Experiment 1). 
9
 Note that in those comparisons where no between-conditions differences existed in 
Experiments 1 and 2 (the induction argument, the Pólya argument and the visual argument for 
students) we might expect that the two different interpretations of the instructions discussed 
above would lead to similar ratings. For both formal proofs we would expect high ratings on 
both admissibility and persuasiveness; and, as discussed above, we might expect students to give 
low ratings to the visual argument on both admissibility and persuasiveness. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1 
Mean Level of Persuasion for each Argument in Experiment 1 
Group Condition N Mean SE 
Heuristic Argument 
Researchers Anon 94 35.8 3.13 
Researchers Named 86 45.9 3.35 
Students Anon 96 46.1 3.13 
Students Named 98 50.8 3.01 
Visual Argument 
Researchers Anon 92 36.1 3.34 
Researchers Named 98 53.4 3.70 
Students Anon 91 40.8 3.46 
Students Named 95 34.3 3.11 
Induction Argument 
Researchers Anon 89 82.2 3.24 
Researchers Named 84 80.3 3.50 
Students Anon 82 74.1 3.30 
Students Named 101 75.0 2.84 
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Table 2 
Classification of Explanatory Comments about the Visual Argument, by Researchers and 
Students (collapsed across conditions) in Experiment 1 
Code Example Res Stu 
Picture not a proof “I was taught that a diagram is not a proof” 2 13 
Closeness to proof “The figure persuades me I could construct a more 
convincing proof if I wanted to” 
12 0 
Missing generality “not all possibilities are included” 14 18 
Other “A lazy proof, likely to infuriate students” 7 5 
Total  35 36 
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Table 3 
Mean Level of Persuasion for each Argument in Experiment 2 
Group Condition N Mean SE 
Heuristic Argument 
Researchers Anon 30 27.8 5.19 
Researchers Named 41 40.0 4.49 
Visual Argument 
Researchers Anon 28 39.8 6.49 
Researchers Named 39 63.5 5.03 
Pólya Argument 
Researchers Anon 28 78.7 6.16 
Researchers Named 32 78.7 4.85 
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Table 4 
Mean Level of Persuasion for each Argument in Experiment 3 
Group Condition N Mean SE 
Heuristic Argument 
Researchers Anon 95 24.2 2.83 
Researchers Named 119 35.8 3.13 
Visual Argument 
Researchers Anon 106 36.2 3.53 
Researchers Named 104 47.6 3.29 
Induction Argument 
Researchers Anon 91 90.4 2.19 
Researchers Named 115 83.9 2.81 
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Figures 
 
Figure 1. Mean level of persuasion for each argument in Experiment 1. Error bars represent ±1 
SE of the mean. 
Figure 2. An illustration of the proposed model. 
Figure 3. The image used in the induction argument. 
Figure 4. The image used in the Pólya argument. 
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Figure 1. Mean level of persuasion for each argument in Experiment 1. Error bars represent ±1 
SE of the mean. 
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Figure 2. An illustration of the proposed model. 
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Figure 3. The image used in the induction argument. 
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Figure 4. The image used in the Pólya argument. 
 
